mechanisms for assessing their utility-including the kinds and quality of 'useful knowledge' they generated. Denoting a knowledge-making practice as useful meant it had immediately recognizable, real-life applications or that it could be made to quickly adapt to the regimens of everyday life. In The Gifts of Athena (2002) , Mokyr made the category of useful knowledge central to understanding the economy's origins in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; however, in so doing he prompted debates and more attention to this admittedly slippery category. As Maxine Berg has explained, Mokyr's focus in The Gifts was 'industrialists, entrepreneurs [and] inventors', with very limited attention to the 'skills, practices and informal know-how exchanged in artisanal workshops'. 6 The divergence between the polite contemplation of nature and making a claim about its utility, or the useful knowledge it generated, was a commonplace in the early-modern world. Even those who felt keenly aware of the need to justify natural philosophy were also often compelled to address its usefulness. This was especially true where a government, such as in the absolutist France of Louis XIV or that of Charles II in Restoration England, might be cajoled into supporting, or at a minimum acknowledging, the merit of natural philosophers. From the point of view of the observers of nature, this concern was inescapable, especially when disputes over experimental practice repeatedly surfaced. 7 On the other hand, even when governments could be convinced that there might be benefit, perhaps from those artisans and craftsmen who marketed their skills and trades in the improvement of navigation, for example, there was a broader question, namely how mechanical knowledge might relate to that of philosophers, if at all.
Imperial reach clearly magnified this epistemological problem when each new discovery raised questions of how new knowledge might be obtained, explained, catalogued or, in some future project, ultimately applied. Yet, as the work of philosopher Ian Hacking has shown, there was no denying that a 'status difference' between theory and practice had arisen that was frequently 'modelled on social rank'. 8 Throughout the eighteenth century, the application of knowledge was always contested socio-political terrain. In 1744, Isaac Newton's experimental assistant, John Theophilus Desaguliers, famously remarked in reference to projectors of water works that he had 'known some Persons of Fortune, who being covetous, but unwilling to own it, full of the Notion of the Difference between Theory and Practice (or excus'd by it) have hearken'd to the most ignorant Pretenders, who have call'd themselves Men of Practice . . . '. The consequence of failing to admit the convergence of theory with everyday life, he continued, was that 'many People employ the Apothecary to save the Charge of the Physician'. 9 For investors in many mechanical ventures, the result all too often proved disastrous. But, note as well that Desaguliers' comparison with physicians and apothecaries was a reflection of social distinctions as well as of knowledge or training.
In Britain there was a space between the Royal Society and the creation, almost a century later, of the Society of Arts, which was designed to promote the success of inventions. Yet, membership between the two occasionally overlapped. Half a century further on, the 'Royal Institution of Great Britain for Diffusing Knowledge, and Facilitating the General Introduction of Useful Mechanical Inventions and Improvements; and For Teaching, By Courses of Philosophical Lectures and Experiments, the Application of Science to the Common Purposes of Life' was founded in 1799. 10 The establishment of a society for diffusing knowledge by strategically creating techniques for introducing 'useful mechanical inventions and improvements' brought into focus a pressing need to encourage practical innovations, even among philosophers primarily invested in the latest dramatic experimental demonstrations.
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Yet, the title did not effectively mask separate goals. The case of the experimentalistphilosopher Humphry Davy is instructive in this regard; his position demanded he could not risk being dismissed as a mere mechanic while failing to adhere to the expectations for men of his standing. 11 Still, he imagined experimental investigation would promote more utility across a broad swath of society and observed in an 1802 lecture that as a result of 'the multiplication of the means of instruction, the man of science and the manufacturer are daily becoming more nearly assimilated to each other'. As he explained to his students:
The artist who formerly affected to despise scientific principles, because he was incapable of perceiving the advantages of them, is now so far enlightened, as to favour the adoption of new processes in his art, whenever they are evidently connected with a diminution of labour. And the increase of projectors, even to too great an extent, demonstrates the enthusiasm of the public mind in its search after improvement. The arts and sciences also are in a high degree cultivated, and patronized by the rich and privileged orders. The guardians of civilization and of refinement, the most powerful and respected part of society, are daily growing more attentive to the realities of life; and, giving up many of their unnecessary enjoyments in consequence of the desire to be useful, are becoming the friends and protectors of the labouring part of the community. The unequal division of property and of labour, the difference of rank and condition amongst mankind, are the sources of power in civilized life, its moving causes, and even its very soul; and in considering and hoping that the human species is capable of becoming more enlightened and more happy, we can only expect that the great whole of society should be ultimately connected together by means of knowledge and the useful arts; that they should act as the children of one great parent, with one determinate end, so that no power may be rendered useless, no exertions thrown away. In this view we do not look to distant ages, or amuse ourselves with brilliant, though delusive dreams concerning the infinite improveability [sic] of man, the annihilation of labour, disease, and even death. But we reason by analogy from simple facts. We consider only a state of human progression arising out of its present condition. We look for a time that we may reasonably expect, for a bright day of which we already behold the dawn.
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Note his emphasis here on utility and the upending of existing social categories as a marker of human happiness, also the focus on moving toward 'a time that we may reasonably expect', one that arises out of existing realities.
In his book, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, Reinhart Koselleck described the relationship between two historical categories: the 'space of experience' and the 'horizon of expectation'. The space of experience, he explained, 'is present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered'; within this space, he argued, was always an 'imagined future', or a 'temporality organized by human thought and humane ends as much as by the contingencies of uncontrolled events'. 13 Expectations are necessary and integral components of the human experience; they are the 'future made present'. The 'horizon of expectation' taking place in the today, Koselleck explained, is 'at once personspecific and interpersonal' and 'directs itself to the not-yet, to the non-experienced, to that which is to be revealed. Hope and fear, wishes and desires, cares and rational analysis, receptive display and curiosity: all enter into expectation and constitute it'. 14 Koselleck's observations in Futures Past helped to lay a foundation for the field of Future Studies, which has served as a forum for systematically studying, modelling and predicting futures. Yet, with some exceptions, scholars have been slow to make expectations an Expectations and utility in eighteenth-century knowledge economies analytical category. 15 This is not to say that we have entirely ignored the concerns and aspirations for the future that historical actors have expressed; however, conversations among historians of science and technology about the eighteenth century have not approached the period's imagined futures as opportunities to assess (again, following Jasanoff and Kim) ideas about 'public purposes, collective futures and the common good' that these dreamscapes contain. Rather, the emphasis has been mainly on the role of curiosity, wonder and the imagination in the shaping of future knowledge projects. 16 Following the lead of Koselleck, the cultural historian Michael Pickering makes a convincing case for distinguishing between expectations and possibilities. Possibilities are almost always not expected to actually occur because 'they diverge from the familiar, from the normal recurrent patterns of everyday life'. 17 Expectations, on the other hand, are 'almost guaranteed their fulfillment' because an expectation, Pickering notes, 'accommodates itself to the horizon of existing social relations and practices in everyday life'. 18 Various modes or horizons of expectation, some more realistic than others, are always at work in any 'space of experience', any 'imagined future'-and this is precisely what makes taking expectations seriously so powerful.
While imposing constraints, the relationship between expectations and utility was a fruitful one that undergirded the production of a wide variety of plans and schemes throughout the period. Rather than dismissing them because of the circumstances surrounding their articulation, our aim here is to turn the problems of eighteenth-century socio-technical plans for the future into opportunities to study the politics and publics for which they were first created. In taking this step, we seek to move ongoing conversations about utility in eighteenth-century knowledge economies, including the actor's category 'useful knowledge', toward issues of contingency, investment and aspiration. We also seek to draw more attention to the actual practices of planning for the future and what relations between usefulness and these practices were expected to yield. As the excerpt from Davy's lecture indicated, projectors frequently harnessed their ideas for improvement to a complete reconfiguration of social roles and categories.
In her piece on 'Deprogramming Baconianism', Vera Keller studies the rise of the 'historiographical construction of the Baconian programme', which she observes 'achieved prominence in the middle of the twentieth century as a means to unite Bacon's epistemic interventions with his social aims, including notions of utility, the promotion of technological intervention and economic growth' (Keller, p. 119). She places an historiographical assessment of the rise and development of this programme in dialogue with analysis of efforts immediately following Bacon's death to standardize 'futureoriented genres' by devising particular kinds of techniques, such as desiderata lists and sciagraphia-draughts or sketches-for developing incomplete plans and risky projects. One of the many advantages of this approach is that it allows for both the positive and negative ways of assessing the 'utilitarianism' at the heart of a so-called 'Baconian programme' to come into fuller view. In short, it becomes possible to see how later assessments (nineteenth and twentieth century) have drawn attention away from how contemporaries actually used Bacon's ideas to reconfigure relations between expectations and utility through various 'adumbrations', producing provisional charcoal sketches or shadowy outlines, throughout the seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries.
In For example, when the professional projector Paul Jacob Marperger, sat down to produce an imagined future, or dreamscape, for the court of Dresden in the 1730s, he had a range of techniques for creating a preliminary sketch or outline of ideas at his disposal, and could use the plans he devised as a tools for drawing together hints-that is, evidence of texts, institutions, practices that actually existed-in new ways. Kelly Whitmer's contribution to the special issue focuses on an elaborate educational reform plan Marperger developed called the 'golden cloverleaf', in which he described a variety of 'well-intended suggestions' for improving the knowledge economies of Saxony, and of Central Europe more generally, through the founding of a Merchant Academy, a Commercial College and several state-funded 'mechanical work schools'. Whitmer's assessment of the Trifolium reveals Marperger's commitment to incremental improvements, or the way in which he 'linked his expectations to existing institutions, technologies and ongoing projects' ( p. 139), especially burgeoning experiments with new kinds of educational institutions and teaching methods. She argues for the centrality of pedagogy in both Marperger's planning efforts and in eighteenth-century project-making more generally. Whitmer's emphasis on the interconnected quality of the plan's three leaves, or parts, also reveals the extent to which visions of techno-scientific improvements, wherein the expertise of craftsmen and merchants was creatively combined to generate entirely new technologies, materials and profit, went hand in hand with a commitment to the cultivation of self and the public good.
Denise Phillips' piece on 'Experimentation in the Agricultural Enlightenment', too, emphasizes the important links between profit-making and a 'commitment to public virtue' in the writings of the 'agricultural improvers' she studies. Agricultural improvers, she argues, were projectors who 'shared a set of experimental values that were partially distinct from the better-studied practices of other savants, but also part of an interdependent conversation with natural philosophers' ( p. 159). Her analysis centres on the figures of Christian Reichart and Otto von Münchhausen (1714 -1774), who is perhaps best known as the author of a popular multi-volume work on estate management called Der Hausvater (1764 -1768). In keeping with the special issue's focus on futureoriented planning practices and contemporary ideas about what was useful, or practical, Phillips argues that a key aim and tactic of agricultural improvers, such as Münchhausen, was to 'test what was possible in a particular locale, not to determine a universal feature of the natural order' ( p. 159). The results, upon which their plans or suggestions for improvement were based, 'often had only limited generalizability' ( p. 159); this prompted practical strategies for management at the local level and the expertise of manual labourers, such as tenant farmers. Yet, in their published work, Münchhausen and other agricultural improvers claimed authority within a broadly conceived public 'through stories of their own economic success as managers of land' ( p. 159). They viewed experimentation as an 'act of economic calculation', central to bringing about certain, highly visible and measurable gains in the near future, as Phillips shows. In a manner reminiscent of earlier projectors, they produced handbooks containing advice and Expectations and utility in eighteenth-century knowledge economies guidelines that were hugely popular in patriotic societies and affluent households across the German states, suggesting (again) the important role of educational treatises and manuals in efforts to generate more utility in the immediate future.
Like Phillips, Dominik Huenniger's contribution participates in efforts to reshape our understanding of relations between oeconomic and natural knowledge in the period by studying late Enlightenment university reform efforts and debates through the lens of Professor Johann Christian Fabricius (1745-1808) . 20 Universities were always connected to state-building and scholars' expectations of their own usefulness in light of these processes, Huenniger argues. Plans for improving the futures of universities-and society-through reform contained a synthesis of often competing ideas about what it meant to make a case that these institutions were useful and necessary to the future expansion of the states that sponsored their growth. The example of Fabricius is instructive, Huenniger shows, because of his preoccupation with economic utility and its relationship to the applied natural history he sought to develop. In his various writings, including his report on a research trip to Norway 'with remarks from natural history and economics', he included reflections on the relationship between natural history and resource extraction. His writings on educational reform, too, were sketchy yet anchored in practical examples of what he knew had been implanted in an ad-hoc manner in various locales, such as introducing children from various socio-economic backgrounds to local products and naturalia in schools. Fabricius' suggestions for improvement, much like Marperger's and the agricultural improvers studied by Phillips, involved directly addressing social categories with the expectation that relations between theory and practice would even out or adjust themselves accordingly.
Rarely were the projects treated in this special issue ever entirely realized. Yet, when placed in dialogue with one another, the effort, investment and conflicting interests involved in both articulating and managing expectations anchored in existing social roles and hierarchies become increasingly visible. Those who were in a position to create plans for what might be, did so by strategically attending to relations between everyday experience and designations of usefulness, which were always in flux. In so doing, they 'made the future present' and they made the dreamscape-and the dreamscaper or projector-a central feature of the 'knowledge economy' in the eighteenth century and beyond.
NOTES 1
Sheila Jasanoff, 'Future imperfect: science, technology, and the imaginations of modernity', in Dreamscapes of modernity: sociotechnical imaginaries and the fabrication of power (University of Chicago Press, 2015). As Jasanoff explains, interests, aspirations and desires-building 'desirable' futures-play central roles in dreamscaping 'because efforts to build new sociotechnological futures are typically grounded in positive visions of social progress. It goes without saying that imaginations of desirable and desired futures correlate, tacitly or explicitly, with the obverse-shared fears of harms that might be incurred through invention and innovation, or of course the failure to innovate'( pp. [4] [5] 
